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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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Russia had more-or-less completed the privatization of 
its manufacturing and natural resource sectors by the 
end of 1997. And in February 1998, the annual inflation 
rate at last dipped into the single digits. Privatization 
should have helped with stronger micro-foundations for 
growth. The conquest of inflation should have cemented 
macroeconomic credibility, lowered real interest rates, 
and spurred investment. Instead, Russia suffered a 
massive public debt-exchange rate-banking crisis just six 
months later, in August 1998. In showing how this turn 
of events unfolded, the authors focus on the interaction 
among Russia’s deteriorating fiscal fundamentals, its weak 
micro-foundations of growth and financial globalization. 
This paper—a joint product of the Europe and Central Asia Region and The Managing Director’s Office—is a draft invited 
submission to the Elsevier Encyclopedia on Financial Globalization. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at bpinto2@worldbank.org or sulatov@worldbank.org. 
They argue that the expectation of a large official bailout 
in the final 10 weeks before the meltdown played an 
important role, with Russia’s external debt increasing 
by $16 billion or 8 percent of post-crisis gross domestic 
product during this time. The lessons and insights 
extracted from the 1998 Russian crisis are of general 
applicability, oil and geopolitics notwithstanding. These 
include a discussion of when financial globalization 
might actually hurt and a cutoff in market access might 
actually help; circumstances in which an official bailout 
could backfire; and why financial engineering tends to 
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Financial Globalization.  The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely 
those of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive 
Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.  We dedicate this paper to the loving 
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here. 




Russia’s 1998 meltdown is yet another instance of financial globalization being linked to 
a crisis in an emerging market instead of better resource allocation and faster growth.
2  On 
August 17, 1998, the Russian government devalued the ruble and announced a forced 
restructuring of its ruble debt obligations falling due to the end of 1999, the face value of which 
was $45 billion at the pre-crisis exchange rate.  It also declared a 90-day moratorium on 
settlements of private external debt, short positions on currency forwards and margin calls on 
repurchase (repo) operations to help its commercial banks, which were heavily exposed to 
government debt.  But the big, private Moscow banks ended up collapsing anyway, with 
depositors given the alternative of transferring their deposits to the state-owned savings bank, 
Sberbank.   
The Russian public debt-exchange rate-banking crisis came on the heels of an external 
financial liberalization which began in January 1997 with a progressive removal of restrictions on 
foreign participation in the lucrative ruble Treasury bill and notes (GKO-OFZ) market—which 
we shall refer to as the “GKO market”--and in the stock market.  This facilitated spillovers from 
the East Asian crisis as Korean and Brazilian investors began exiting the GKO market in October 
1997as a result of liquidity pressures at home.  This sequence does not mean that financial 
globalization caused the Russian crisis.  But it amplified vulnerability stemming from Russia’s 
combination of a fixed exchange rate and adverse government debt dynamics by prolonging an 
unsustainable fiscal position.  It did so at first by lowering interest rates on government debt and 
then by continuing to finance the build-up of government debt after May 1998 even when it 
became apparent that a fundamentals-based crisis was all but inevitable along the lines of 
                                                      
2 We shall refer to this crisis variously as Russia 1998, the Russian meltdown or the devaluation and default 
of August 1998.  3 
 
Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984) and Sargent and Wallace (1981).  This eventually led 
to a much bigger public external debt burden when events came to a head on August 17, 1998. 
1.1 Global  Context 
In the Emerging Market Crises Hall of Fame--if there ever were such a thing--Russia 
1998 would surely be assigned a place of distinction.  It was preceded by the East Asian crisis of 
1997-98, which began with the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997, and then spread to 
envelope many of the prominent economies of East Asia.  It was followed by Brazil in January 
1999 and then Turkey and Argentina in 2000-01.  Contagion from Russia 1998 led to a 
substantial rise in spreads on sovereign bonds in emerging markets and on long-term corporate 
bonds in industrial countries as well as a big increase in the volatility of these spreads.  A Bank of 
International Settlements poll of market participants described the joint event of the August 1998 
Russian meltdown plus the bailout of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) 
the following month as the “worst crisis” in recent times.
3   
A review of the events suggests that LTCM’s near-collapse was precipitated in part by 
the Russian meltdown.  Dungey et al. (2006, p. 3) note that bond spreads, especially in emerging 
markets, spiked after the Russian devaluation and default as global credit risks were re-priced; 
LTCM had taken big bets on the expectation of falling spreads.  Jorion’s (2000) post-mortem 
indicates that LTCM took a substantial hit soon after Russia’s August 17, 1998 meltdown.  He 
reports that credit spreads rose sharply following the Russian “bombshell” while stock markets 
plunged.  “LTCM lost $550 million on August 21
st alone” and 52 percent of its December 31 
1997 value had been erased by the end of August 1998.  Had LTCM been allowed to fail, the 
risks to the US and global financial system were judged to be catastrophic because of both its on-
balance sheet ($125 billion) and off-balance sheet ($1.25 trillion in various derivatives) 
transactions.  The forced deleveraging to meet margin calls would have resulted in a downward  4 
 
spiral--to borrow language reminiscent of the more recent Great Recession.  To stave off a 
systemic crisis, the New York Federal Reserve organized a bailout by encouraging 14 banks to 
invest $3.6 billion for a 90 percent stake in LTCM.  And the Federal Reserve Board eased 
monetary policy aggressively by cutting interest rates thrice in quick succession.
4 
1.2  The Country Crisis 
Given the above, it is unsurprising that the contagion effects of Russia 1998 have been 
carefully studied.
5  But the country crisis episode itself has received scant attention in the 
literature, perhaps because of the belief that the lessons may not have been transferable to other 
emerging markets given oil and Russia’s special geopolitical position.
6  In revisiting Russia 1998, 
we shall show that the lessons from it are of general importance.  Indeed, paying closer heed to 
Russia 1998 might well have influenced the design of the international rescue packages for 
Argentina and Turkey in 2000-01, especially the former.   
Our paper is organized as follows: section 2 analyzes the evolution of Russia’s 
fundamentals during the three years preceding the August 1998 crisis.  We argue that the crucial 
factor in Russia’s crisis was an attempt to stamp out inflation while maintaining large subsidies to 
manufacturing firms.  In section 3, we look at the role of financial globalization and argue that in 
the prevailing environment of pervasive soft budgets, financial liberalization merely postponed 
the day of reckoning while adding substantially to the government’s external debt.  In section 4, 
we present the lessons from Russia 1998 followed by a brief concluding section.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
3 See Dungey et al. (2006) for details.   
4 See Dungey et al. (2006). 
5 In addition to Dungey et al (2006), see Calvo (1998) and Forbes (2000). 
6 At one point, Russia 1998 even threatened to be injected into the 2000 US Presidential elections as an 
issue!  Writing in the Washington Post (“Policymakers Debate: ‘Who Lost Russia?’” page A1, September 
12, 1999), Michael Dobbs and Paul Blustein noted: “The finger-pointing over ‘Who lost Russia?’ threatens 
to spill over into next year’s US presidential election campaign.  Foreign policy advisers to George W Bush  5 
 
2.  Russia’s Three-year Road to the 1998 Crisis 
By the end of 1997, Russia had more-or-less completed the privatization of its 
manufacturing and natural resource sectors.  And in February 1998, annual inflation at last dipped 
into the single digits.  In spite of these accomplishments, Russia experienced an economic 
meltdown just six months later.  This section explains how this happened, showing that Russia’s 
crisis was in the making for some three years.
7 
2.1  The Stabilization Program 
We start with the inflation reduction.  In mid-1995, Russia adopted a stabilization program 
with the goal of achieving single-digit inflation by 1997 and shrinking the fiscal deficit of the 
federal government to less than 3 percent of GDP by 1998.  Its centerpiece was a fixed exchange 
rate as a nominal anchor for prices, to be supported by reductions in the fiscal deficit, a shift away 
from printing money to debt-financing of the deficit and restrictions on credit to the private 
sector.
8  But real interest rates jumped to extraordinarily high levels and the real exchange rate 
appreciated sharply.  The ex-ante short-term real interest rate averaged 56 percent between May 
1995 and July 1997 (figure 1) while the ruble appreciated by some 55 percent in real terms 
against the US dollar over the same period (figure 2).   








                                                                                                                                                              
are attempting to link Vice President Gore to the failure of economic reform in Russia….”  Of course, it 
was Russia 1998 which epitomized the ‘failure’.  
7 This section draws chiefly on Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001); Pinto, Gurvich and Ulatov (2005); Pinto, 
Drebentsov and Morozov (2000a, b);  and Commander and Mumssen (1999). 
8 The exchange rate was fixed in the sense that it was managed within tight, pre-announced bounds relative 
to the level of prevailing inflation.  6 
 
            Figure 1: Real Short-term Interest Rates, January 1995 – August 1998
a/ 
(% per year) 
 
            Source: Figure 1, Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001).   
  a/ Average nominal secondary market GKO yield deflated by 12-month inflation target under IMF program. 
Why did real interest rates jump to such high levels, effectively killing growth?  For three 
reasons: first, as Table 1 shows, the original fiscal program targets agreed to between Russia and 
the IMF were met in 1995 but greatly exceeded thereafter; in fact, the fiscal deficit went up 
sharply after 1995 instead of shrinking.
9  This meant more borrowing than anticipated, hurting 
credibility and pushing up real interest rates, especially as a domestic credit squeeze was 
simultaneously on to lower inflation.   




 Source:  Figure 2 in Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001). 
a/ Ratio of Russian CPI to trade-weighted geometric mean of trading partners CPI times nominal exchange rate.  
Upward (downward) movement signifies appreciation (depreciation). 
                                                      
9 NB: the program targets were continually revised.  What is relevant for a post-mortem is how actual 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































Second, political risk was exceptionally high in 1996.  Boris Yeltsin’s ratings were at single-digit 
levels as late as March 1996, with elections scheduled for June.  He finally staved off a spirited 
challenge from the communist party leader, Gennady Zyuganov, winning by a small majority in 
the second round.  Third, the big Moscow banks, which served as primary dealers in the GKO 
market, had considerable monopsony power until external access was liberalized in January 1997 
and this might have artificially boosted real interest rates.  Note that real interest rates came down 
after Yeltsin was re-elected in July 1996 and dropped to below 20 percent after April 1997 as the 
GKO market was liberalized; but by then the nonpayments system had become entrenched, as we 
shall see in the next sub-section, preventing any beneficial impact on enterprises.  Real interest 
rates then started rising again after the spillover from the East Asian crisis in November 1997. 
  Table 1: Macroeconomic Performance Over 1995-1998 
Year  12-Month Inflation (%)  Fiscal deficit/GDP (%) 
a/ 
  Original Program     
       Target 
Actual  Original Program 






















   5.9 
b/ 
     Source: Table 2, Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001). 
   Note: Russia’s quest for single-digit inflation began in July 1995, supported by a three-year Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF) IMF loan stipulating inflation and fiscal deficit targets for 1996-98.  The targets for 1995 had been set earlier in the 
context of an IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA).   
      a/Deficit of the federal government on a commitments basis. 
b/ Excluding overdue interest on GKO/OFZ.  
 
 
The real appreciation of the ruble is easier to explain.  As Dornbusch and Werner (1994) 
note, it is a frequent artifact of exchange rate-based inflation reduction programs: by design, the 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate is kept much lower than the prevailing rate of inflation, 
which converges to the target rate of currency depreciation only slowly over time.  This could 
lead to substantial real appreciation and even overvaluation in the interim if productivity 
increases do not keep pace.  This is in fact what happened in Russia after mid-1995, when the  8 
 
stabilization program began.  As Figure 2 shows, the real exchange rate appreciated until around 
1997 and then stayed at that level until the meltdown of August 1998, at which point it plunged 
along with the ruble.  
2.2  Impact on the Enterprise Sector 
Privatization did not lead to more efficient and better-run enterprises in Russia.  The first 
reason was the nature of the privatization program itself.  Some 15,000 industrial enterprises were 
“mass privatized”, with control often going to insiders.  In the “loans-for-shares” scheme carried 
out in late 1995, Russian banks lent the government money collateralized with the shares of 
valuable companies in oil, metals and telecoms, with the proviso that if the loans were not repaid, 
the banks would acquire the shares.  The loan size was determined via auctions that were not 
transparent, and suspected to be rigged.
10  In the circumstances, good corporate governance 
would take a long time to emerge.   
The next two reasons all but ensured that enterprises were not going to restructure and 
further that the incentives for managers would be biased towards asset stripping.  The first was 
the punishing macroeconomic environment described above.  No manager however good can 
operate in a situation where real interest rates are in excess of 50 percent and the real exchange 
rate is appreciating rapidly over a prolonged period.   
The second was equally compelling but much more pernicious: the proliferation of soft 
budgets via the so-called “nonpayments system.”
11   Nonpayments consisted of two parts:  (i) 
arrears, or overdue payments, which grew from 15 percent of GDP at end-1994 to an astonishing 
40 percent of GDP at end-1998; and (ii) growing use of non-cash settlements (NCS), in enterprise 
operations.  NCS included barter, typically in a chain involving several enterprises facilitated by 
an intermediary; offsets or the mutual cancelation of arrears, of which the most common kind was 
the provision of goods and services in lieu of tax payments, known as “tax offsets”; and veksels 
                                                      
10 See Lieberman and Veimetra (1996); Blasi et al (1997); Black et al (2000);   9 
 
or promissory notes issued by enterprises, banks or the government.  Nonpayments grew rapidly 
between 1995 and 1998 and became entrenched as the most common way for enterprises to 
conduct business—in effect becoming a new form of industrial organization.  This happened 
roughly in the following sequence:   
Initially, nonpayments was a survival response by enterprises.  Those in heavy industry 
or the old military-industry complex were apt to have the highest share of sales in the form of 
barter and those selling fast-moving consumer goods the lowest, as confirmed by enterprise 
surveys.   
Subsequently, nonpayments grew spectacularly over 1995-98 coinciding with the high 
real interest rates and real appreciation of the ruble engendered by the stabilization program; the 
analysis in Commander and Mumssen (1999) suggests that this was more than coincidence; the 
high real interest rates caused a distinct preference for barter and other forms of NCS.  
Interestingly enough, the government itself became a primary instigator.  Over the 1995 – mid 
1998 disinflation, NCS accounted for as much as 50 percent of spending by regional 
governments, while money surrogates and tax offsets averaged over 20 percent for federal 
government non-interest spending.  The government’s example was quickly emulated by 
enterprises, giving them an excuse to deliberately run up tax arrears that could be settled at a 
lower cost through offsets (which incorporated tax forgiveness through the use of inflated prices 
when taxes were paid in kind).  This was a major factor legitimizing tax arrears and contributing 
to the persistent shortfall of cash taxes over 1996-98.   
Nonpayments morphed into an entrenched habit when profitable, cash-rich enterprises 
joined the bandwagon.  They ‘gamed’ the system, running up tax arrears which could then be 
settled at a discount in kind; bought monetary surrogates from struggling enterprises—which had 
received these from the government in exchange for their unsaleable goods—at a discount, then 
                                                                                                                                                              
11 The discussion here is based mainly on Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov (2000a, b).  10 
 
redeeming them at full face value to pay their taxes; and most perniciously, shifted profits to 
intermediaries set up and owned by them through arbitrary transfer pricing.  This was an ideal 
environment in which to strip enterprise assets for personal enrichment and led to a vicious circle: 
with its taxes flagging, inadequate expenditure control and sky-high real interest rates, the 
government intensified its own use of arrears and monetary surrogates.   
  What were the government’s motives?  Apart from its desire to economize on cash 
because of the high real interest rates, it wanted to prevent mass bankruptcy among 
manufacturing enterprises struggling with the rigors of the stabilization program.  While never 
explicitly articulated, various government actions suggested an attempt to keep enterprises afloat 
and avoid open unemployment at all cost.  Such actions included interference by regional 
governors in preventing non-paying enterprises from being disconnected by the local utility 
company; customizing tax exemptions, including tax offsets at inflated prices; and giving local 
companies preference for state orders. The stoppage of directed credits at the beginning of 1995 
and curtailment of explicit budgetary subsidies for enterprises at the federal level over the 1995 – 
mid 1998 disinflation were eventually more than offset by growing implicit subsidies.  
Estimates of the size of the subsidies to the manufacturing sector implicit in nonpayments 
are presented in Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov (2000a, b).  While arrears were treated as a 100 
percent subsidy (it was realistically assumed no one expected to recover on arrears), a 23 percent 
subsidy rate was applied to tax offsets and energy payments on the assumption that in-kind 
payments inflated prices by 30 percent.
12  Implicit subsidies to manufacturing were estimated at 
8-12 percent of GDP in 1996 and 7-10 percent of GDP in 1997.  Add to this the explicit 
budgetary subsidy of 8 percent and total subsidies to manufacturing were 15-20 percent of GDP 
in 1996 and 1997.  No wonder asset stripping intensified and the stabilization collapsed.  Thus, 
                                                      
12 The noncash price inflation of 30 percent came from estimates used in the Ministry of Finance.  The gas 
monopoly Gazprom once offered cash discounts of 30 percent, but there were no takers, suggesting  11 
 
nonpayments killed growth and as we shall see in the next sub-section, eventually led to 
instability in the government’s debt dynamics. 
  2.3  Impact on Government Debt 
  We start with the standard difference equation for government debt.  In equation (1), d is 
the government debt-to-GDP ratio, pd the ratio of the primary fiscal deficit (noninterest spending 
minus revenues) to GDP, ndfs, the ratio of non-debt financing sources to GDP (such as sales 
proceeds from privatization), r the real interest rate paid by the government on its debt obligations 
and g the real growth rate of GDP with t denoting the year.
13   
 (1)  1
)
1 ) 1 (
(
) (   

    t
t
t t
t t t t d
g
g r
ndfs pd d d . 
As expected from large fiscal deficits over 1995-97, the increase in nominal debt measured in US 
dollars was substantial over this period, as Table 2 shows; but, in spite of large primary fiscal 
deficits, sizable interest payments and negative (or small positive) growth, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
remains roughly constant over 1995-97 in apparent defiance of equation (1), which would suggest 
an explosive path.   
  
                                                                                                                                                              
enterprise could ‘make’ more than 30 percent by not paying their gas bills and then settling in kind.  A 30 
percent price inflation translates into a 23 percent subsidy rate = (1/1.3)-1. 
13 A derivation of the equation may be found in the technical appendix to Aizenman and Pinto (2005).  12 
 
























































a/ Cash plus noncash basis. 
b/ Domestic plus foreign, end of period. 
c/ Does not
 capture the subsequent debt renegotiation.  
Source: Table 9.1, Pinto, Gurvich and Ulatov (2005). 
 
The answer to this puzzle can be found in movement of the real exchange rate.  The real 
interest rate, r, is a composite of that paid on ruble and dollar-denominated debt, with the weights 
determined by the relative shares of these currencies in total government debt.  Here’s what 
happened over 1995-97: even though real interest rates on ruble debt were high and growing, it 
accounted for a relatively small share of total debt; even in 1997, ruble debt was just 37 percent 
of total debt.  With the real exchange rate appreciating rapidly over this period, Russia enjoyed 
substantial valuation gains on dollar-denominated debt.  Thus, Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001) 
estimate that in 1996 alone, the effect of real appreciation was to lower the ratio of government 
debt by 8 percentage points of GDP, which would offset a substantial fiscal deficit.  But there is a 
problem if the real exchange rate is becoming overvalued, which we shall argue later was the case 
in Russia.   
How did nonpayments feed into the government’s debt dynamics?  Directly, as it turns 
out.  The biggest implicit subsidy providers to the manufacturing sector via nonpayments—oil, 
gas, electricity, railways—became delinquent on their own tax payments in order to compensate 
themselves.  At the same time, manufacturing companies ran their own tax arrears.  The 
combined effect led to chronic tax shortfalls and hence, higher primary fiscal deficits and greater  13 
 
government borrowing than budgeted.  Pinto, Drebentsov, and Morozov (2000b) attribute some 
65 percent of the net new borrowing by the federal government during 1996 and 1997 to these tax 
arrears and the resulting cash revenue shortfalls.   
A last point: could falling oil prices have worsened Russia’s government debt dynamics 
and contributed to the crisis?  The answer has two parts: first, oil prices did not influence 
government debt dynamics significantly before the 1998 crisis.  The reason was that many of the 
taxes on oil were specific, rather than ad valorem; besides, oil companies had managed to 
consistently show low profits, regardless of price level.  But after the crisis, oil export taxes were 
brought back in early 1999 and increased substantially in 2000 as oil prices took off, establishing 
a close link between the primary fiscal surplus at the federal government level and oil prices.
14  
Second, the impact of oil price changes on the fiscal accounts pales in comparison with 
nonpayments.  Table 3 presents relevant data for 1996-98. 
Table 3: Oil prices, implicit subsidies and Federal government borrowing  
  1996 1997 1998 
Oil Revenues/ GDP   4.1 3.4 2.6 
     
Implicit subsidies (% GDP)   4.9 3.6 6.9 
New net borrowing of the federal government (% GDP)  7.4  5.7    9.2
a/ 
Average Oil price (Urals, US$/bbl)  20.1 18.3 11.8 
Source: Oil prices and revenues from Min Fin, Rosstat, IMF; rest of the data from Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov 
(2000b). 
a/ Reflects the large depreciation of the ruble after August 17, 1998. 
 
The table makes the point convincingly.  Oil prices fell by 35 percent in 1998 relative to 1997 
with a significant negative impact on the current account balance as we shall see below; but oil 
revenues declined by less than 1 percentage point of GDP while implicit subsidies rose by a 
whopping 3.3 percentage points of GDP. 
                                                      
14 IMF (2000a) attributes the big fiscal improvement in 2000 to discretionary tax policy changes, of which 
the re-introduced and expanded export taxes on oil were probably the most important component. But prior  14 
 
3.   Financial Globalization and Russia 1998    
The crucial question on financial globalization is: Given Russia’s fiscal and growth 
fundamentals, why were investors so anxious to lend to Russia and in such large quantities?  In 
answering it, three periods may be distinguished: the surge in capital inflows which began in the 
early 1997; the beginning of speculative attacks on the ruble coinciding with the spillover of the 
East Asian crisis in November 1997; and the $16 billion—8 percent of post-crisis GDP—increase 
in the government’s dollar-denominated external debt after June 1 1998, even though it was 
evident by May that the Russian government was facing serious solvency problems.  The reasons 
for capital flows shifted over time; but ironically the amounts lent grew as the fundamentals 
worsened. 
Until the spillover of East Asian crisis in November 1997, confidence and market 
sentiment were strengthening in Russia for political and economic reasons—the latter narrowly 
interpreted as falling inflation; but cash tax shortfalls had become chronic and the micro-
foundations for growth remained weak, a ‘disconnect’ which did not go unnoticed by investors, 
as we shall see below.  The discussion starts with this disconnect and then goes on to present 
numbers on capital flows; the role of Russian banks in channeling funds to the government debt 
market; moral hazard as a factor explaining investors’ willingness to increase their exposure to 
Russia even while signaling rapidly growing concern about devaluation and default; a desperate 
attempt by the government to retrieve its fiscal situation via the “GKO-Eurobond swap”; and the 
eventual meltdown even as an international rescue package arrived. 
3.1 Improving  Sentiment 
After a cumulative decline in real GDP of 40 percent over 1990-95, there was considerable 
optimism in early 1996 that Russia would resume growing that year and attain steady growth 
                                                                                                                                                              
to 1998, while falling oil prices would worsen the current account, they did not have a significant impact on  15 
 
rates of some 5 percent thereafter.  Typical was this quote from Economist Intelligence Unit (1
st 
quarter 1996): “As the EIU has long been predicting, 1996 is going to be the year in which Russia 
finally achieves real GDP growth....This opinion is shared by most other forecasters...”
15   
Even though real GDP ended up falling by 3.4 percent that year, the fact that inflation was 
being licked brought in a new element of hope: results reported in Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996 
p. 59) based on the experience of the transition countries of central Europe indicated that “… 
stabilization appears close to being both a necessary and sufficient condition for growth”.  In 
January 1997, then first deputy managing director of the IMF Stanley Fischer a meeting at 
Harvard University and was cited as follows:
16  “Russia, he said, has achieved macroeconomic 
stabilization….The IMF is virtually certain, he declared, that real growth is underestimated and 
will soon show up in official figures…”  Not long after this endorsement, President Yeltsin, 
whose re-election in July 1996 had led to firming political certainty, appointed an economic 
“dream team” spearheaded by two reformers.
17  One could therefore argue that market sentiment 
had a solid basis for turning positive.  This coincided with a progressive relaxation in restrictions 
on foreign portfolio investment starting in 1997.  Thus, perceptions of improving economic 
prospects and external financial liberalization might explain the big boom in foreign financial 
participation in 1997. 
Another reason might simply be that Wall Street and other financial investors were lulled 
into complacency by rules-of-thumb, which suggested all was well with Russia’s fundamentals.  
The government’s debt was steady around 50 percent of GDP, much less than the Maastricht rule 
of 60 percent, as shown in Table 2; the current account balance hovered around zero and did not 
                                                                                                                                                              
debt dynamics.  
15 EIU Country Report: Russia, 1
st quarter 1996.  Page 8 forecast real GDP growth of 3 percent for 1996 
and 4 percent for 1997.  Actual outcomes were -3.4 percent for 1996 and +0.9 percent for 1997.  
16 U.S.-Russian Investment Symposium, January 9-12, 1997.  Final Report, p. 3.  Harvard University, 
Cambridge, Mass.  USA. 
17 Privatization czar Anatoly Chubais was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, 
while the reformist governor of Nizhny Novgorod, Boris Nemtsov, was appointed First Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for Fuel and Energy.  16 
 
indicate need for panic; and money management companies were valuing Russian companies in 
the natural resource and other sectors based on their physical assets relative to similar companies 
elsewhere in the world, e.g., barrels of oil or kilometers of railways or cubic meters of gas, which 
suggested considerable undervaluation—even though the underlying assets had not yet shown up 
in earnings per share, cash profits or dividends.  The money managers described Russia as an 
“asset play”. 
But judging from the buzz at the Dow Jones/Sachs Second Annual Russia Investment 
Conference held in New York in March 1997, disquiet was beginning to set in.  Several speakers 
extolled the conquest of inflation but remarked on the “widening gap” between macroeconomic 
and microeconomic performance.  This macro-micro “disconnect “was described most forcefully 
by the then CEO of Renaissance Capital, who described the booming stock market as “macro 
driven” as a result of falling inflation and interest rates and the inclusion of Russia in the IFC 
investable index—even as production was still falling with enterprise debt and arrears rising.
18   
A few months later, an informal economic report prepared by two economists, one from 
the IMF and the other from the International Finance Corporation (the World Bank Group’s 
private sector arm), noted in relation to the disconnect: 
  “Russia has achieved considerable success in stabilization and privatization.  However, 
there are no signs yet of a sustainable jump to high growth rates.  Based on the Central European 
experience, this paper concludes that this process is not going to be automatic.  Rather, a 
significant agenda of unfinished reforms remains. 
  At the top of the list is the enforcement of hard budget constraints at the enterprise level.  
Although macroeconomic discipline exists, the individual enterprise’s budget is softened by weak 
                                                      
18 First author’s notes dated March 13, 1997 from Dow Jones/Sachs Second Annual Russia Investment 
Conference held March 5-6 1997.  17 
 
enforcement of taxes, the use of non-monetary payments and growing arrears, laxity in 
bankruptcy enforcement and a parochial attitude toward public procurement…..”
19 
3.2 Capital  Inflows 
Notwithstanding the macro-micro “disconnect”, the money kept flowing in, attracted by 
Russia’s “asset play”.  This sub-section provides only a quick sketch of the capital flow numbers 
in Table 4 and the main events surrounding them; the underlying economics and a more detailed 
chronology follow in sub-sections 3.3 to 3.6 below.  Box 1 provides an overview of balance-of-
payments accounting as a guide to Table 4. 
 The impact of improving market sentiment combined with liberalized access to the GKO 
market is evident: portfolio flows into the GKO market just in the first quarter of 1997 were more 
than thrice the amount for the whole of 1996 as shown in Table 4.  Reserves rose rapidly and the 
stock market boomed as captured by the RTS index reported in the table.  And ‘Other capital 
flows, net’, which includes capital flight as well as purchases of dollars by households, dropped 
during the first two quarters of 1997.   
There was an equally dramatic reversal in the fourth quarter of 1997 as the Asian crisis 
spilled over.  Inflows into the GKO market, which had already fallen sharply in the third quarter, 
fell precipitously in the fourth while capital flight resumed and reserves and the stock market both 








                                                      
19 Buckberg and Pinto (1997).  In retrospect, the statement about macroeconomic discipline was optimistic.  18 
 
Table 4:  Capital Inflows, Foreign Exchange Reserves and the Stock market 
1996 1997  1998 
 Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 
Current account, $ mln  10847 2823  -714 -1503  -687  -2957 -3637  775  6038 
Net portfolio inflows, $ mln
 a/    4411 6089 8020 2042 1338  4238 3900  928  -448 
of which:    
GKO/OFZ  1613 4013 4789 1859  220  3098 -331 -2267  -862 
Eurobonds
   1004 1229 1987  98  369  689  4097 2318  -140 
Equity   2035 424 307  372  194  25  33  -20  666 
Other portfolio inflows, net  -241 422 936 -287 555  425 101 898  -112 
Other capital flows, net, $ mln
 b/    -19292  -7117 494 -2829 -7891 -2375 -882 -4569 -7426 
Reserves, $ bn 
c/  15.3 16.5 24.5 23.1 17.8  16.9 16.2 12.7  12.2 
RTS index 
d/   201 301 419 498 396  326 151  44  59 
Source: CBR, authors’ calculation 
a/  Includes both private and public sector.  
b/  Includes errors & omissions, “-“ equals outflow. 
 c/  CBR
 gross  reserves, including gold. 
d/  Official index of the Russian stock exchange, end of period, dollar-based. 
 
The third and final round of speculative attacks on the ruble began in May 1998.  In the 
second quarter of 1998, three things happened: by mid-May, the realization had set in that fiscal 
fundamentals were weak and international liquidity low.  Falling oil prices were reflected in a 
growing current account deficit, so policymakers were battling a triple whammy of unsustainable 
debt dynamics, low reserves and a fast-deteriorating current account.  But as Table 4 shows, the 
second quarter current account deficit was offset by net portfolio inflows largely because the 
government had started issuing Eurobonds as part of a move to lengthen maturities and lower 
borrowing costs.   
   The ruble peg was finally abandoned in August 1998.  Table 4 shows the large decline in 
reserves in the third quarter of 1998, explained by the exit from GKOs and the big increase in the 
size of “Other capital flows, net” as domestic residents shifted out of ruble assets into dollars.  
Net portfolio flows remained positive overall because of the large volume of official borrowings 
as an international rescue package kicked in after July 20, 1998.  The impact of the meltdown 
also shows up in the plunge in the RTS index to less than a third of its value at the end of the 
previous quarter as the ruble collapsed.  But the current account sharply reversed following the  19 
 
large real depreciation of the ruble which accompanied the meltdown (shown in Figure 2 above) 
and then turned into a massive surplus in the fourth quarter. We now turn to a more detailed 
examination of the events underlying the numbers in Table 4 in the sub-sections 3.3 to 3.6. 
Box 1: Intricacies of Balance-of-Payments Accounting as a Guide to Table 4
a/ 
The point of ultimate interest in Table 4 is what happens to the foreign exchange reserves of the central 
bank, CBR, as this is where a speculative attack on the ruble will show up. 
Let’s start with: 
Increase in reserves = Current account surplus + Net portfolio inflows + Other capital flows net. 
This is the accounting identity underlying Table 4.  Our interest is in the mechanics of the speculative 
attack (outlined in sub-sections 3.3 to 3.6) and how this would show up in the numbers in Table 4.  In the 
story below, two points are of interest: 
(i) what the impact of actions taken by Russian commercial banks would be.  Suppose a commercial bank 
sold its holdings of GKOs and bought dollars with the ruble proceeds.  This would show up in “Other 
capital flows net”.  So would a use of the ruble proceeds by the bank to buy dollars and use these dollars to 
meet margin calls on collateralized loans from overseas.  This is treated as a reduction in the external 
liabilities of the bank and is included by CBR in a sub-account of  “Other capital flows net”.  
(ii) how a portfolio shift out of ruble assets and into dollars by domestic, non-bank residents would be 
reflected.  This captures an important point forcefully made in the context of the 1997-98 East Asian crisis 
by Chang and Velasco (2000), that when the exchange rate is fixed, the claims on foreign exchange 
reserves includes not just short-term external debt but the whole of broad money.  Pinto, Kharas and Ulatov 
(2001, pp 30-32) reflect this point in the calculation of international liquidity indices for Russia prior to its 
August 1998 crisis.  The point is that the shift out of broad money into cash dollars by domestic residents 
ignited by panic could be a potent force in the speculative attack.  This shift, or the purchases of dollars by 
domestic residents, is also captured in “Other capital flows net”. 
A final point: net borrowing by the Russian government from official sources (bilateral or from the 
international financial institutions) is also included in “Other capital flows net” in Table 4.  On the other 
hand, borrowing via GKOs and Eurobonds from private external (non-resident) sources is included in “Net 
portfolio inflows”, as one would expect.  
a/We are not, to be honest, specialists in balance-of-payments accounting.  These points were therefore verified in 
conversations the second author had with CBR officials in Moscow. 
3.3 Russia’s  Banks 
When external liberalization and an capital account lead to a crisis, the domestic private 
banks usually play a crucial role in three respects: first, they intermediate capital inflows from 
abroad and on-lend these to domestic residents, sometimes contributing to an asset bubble and 
eventually to a build-up of non-performing loans, especially when bank supervision is weak;  20 
 
second, currency mismatches often result in an environment where domestic interest rates are 
much higher than the foreign interest rates and the exchange rate is fixed; and third, when the 
banks are eventually bailed out, their private external debts are often taken over by the 
government, adding to public indebtedness.  This was the story of the Southern Cone Latin 
American countries, vividly described by Carlos Diaz-Alejandro in his 1985 classic (Diaz-
Alejandro 1985), which to a large extent foreshadowed what happened in East Asia in 1997-98. 
But the Russian story was somewhat different.  While currency mismatches developed on 
the balance sheets of the banks themselves (as a result of borrowing externally in hard currency 
and investing in ruble government debt), the other two channels were absent as banks’ links with 
the Russian real sector were limited and the government let the banks collapse instead of bailing 
them out.  Besides, Russian commercial banks were much smaller than those in East Asia or 
Argentina.  Total household deposits just before the crisis were approximately 7 percent of GDP, 
compared to over 30 percent for East Asia; and credit to the private sector was a paltry 4 percent 
of GDP, compared to 30 percent for Central and Eastern Europe.
20  Moreover, over 75 percent of 
household deposits were held in the state-owned savings bank, Sberbank, under an implicit 
deposit guarantee.  Under this configuration, a bank bailout would have been unlikely to 
contribute to a fiscal crisis;
21 the actual amount spent to prop up banks, including emergency 
loans to large banks before the meltdown, has been estimated at no more than 2 percent of 1998 
GDP.  This compares with public bailouts of over 10 percent in Hungary in the early 1990s, and a 
multiple of that figure in the Asian crisis countries.  
Excluding Sberbank, the banking system was dominated by a few large private Moscow-
based banks, well-connected politically and part of “Financial Industrial Groups” built around 
                                                      
20 Figures for household deposits from Sinegubko (1998). Central and Eastern Europe includes Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia.  See IMF (2003, table 6.2). 
21 The moral hazard argument of Dooley (1998); Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001); and Kharas 
and Mishra (2001) explores the role of prospective fiscal deficits caused by implicit bailout guarantees to 
banks in the context of the Asian crisis.  21 
 
natural resource exporters that engaged in connected lending and were heavily invested in 
government securities.  While there was a tendency to regard Russian banks as being in the 
vanguard of the movement toward markets, Tompson (1997) describes how little their role 
differed from their Soviet era counterparts.  Most of these banks had made their money in shady 
ways, as “authorized banks” for treasury operations, which amounted to their receiving interest-
free loans at a time of high inflation and devaluation---and subsequently, high real interest rates 
on ruble government debt when the stabilization program began in mid-1995.  They extended 
their reach through the notorious “shares-for-loans” privatization auctions in 1995-96, lending the 
Russian government money collateralized with the shares of valuable companies in the oil, 
metals, and telecom sectors, with the proviso that if the loans were not repaid, the banks would 
acquire the shares.  The loan size was determined through auctions that were suspected to be 
rigged (Lieberman and Veimetra 1996).
22  
From the perspective of financial globalization, the banks had little to do with the real 
sector and their main role was to act as a funnel to the government debt market: in effect, they 
were sovereign risk.  Their exposures could be categorized as follows:  
  Panics and runs on deposits (applicable to banks everywhere) 
  Exchange or devaluation risk, owing to (i) borrowing in hard currency via syndicated loans 
and investing in ruble government debt; and (ii) from unhedged positions resulting from 
buying rubles forward for dollars from non-resident investors in GKOs (“currency forwards”) 
  Rollover risk from maturing syndicated loans 
  Default risk on their holdings of government dollar-denominated debt and related margin 
calls.  Russian banks had effectively bought MinFin bonds on margin via repo arrangements 
                                                      
22 On how the large Moscow banks made their money, see Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova (2000). An 
excellent, detailed analysis of the weakness of the banking system appears in Sinegubko (1998), which also 
contains an early quantification of balance sheet and off-balance sheet losses.  The results of a post-crash 
audit of 18 large banks based on international accounting standards are reported in van Schaik (1999).   22 
 
collateralized with these bonds; any rise in bond spread fueled by default concerns would 
lower the price of this collateral and trigger margin calls.
 23 
While pre-crisis assessments of the banks’ portfolios were difficult because of unreliable 
data, their vulnerability to the deteriorating fiscal situation became apparent towards the end of 
1997.
  Notwithstanding the welcome downward trend in inflation and interest rates, the chronic 
shortfall in cash tax collections prompted the IMF mission to leave at the end of October 1997 
without completing its review and suspending disbursement of its loans.  This action coincided 
with the exit of Korean and Brazilian investors from the GKO market as the East Asian crisis 
spilled over.  Treating this event as a confidence shock, CBR attempted to calm the markets by 
announcing that from January 1998, it would target a central rate for the ruble of 6.2 per dollar 
with a +/- 15 percent fluctuation band, compared to the then rate of ruble 5.9 per dollar.  It was 
eventually forced to raise interest rates in a defense of the ruble after using up $6 billion out of its 
reserves of $23 billion that November.   
Bank portfolios took a hit owing to the rise in ruble interest rates as well as bond spreads 
on dollar-denominated government debt (discussed below in the context of Figure 3), exposing 
the banks to margin calls and rollover risks on syndicated loans. Either or both would have forced 
the banks to sell liquid assets–their holdings of GKOs–possibly setting off a downward spiral, 
while the need to raise dollars to meet margin calls and repay syndicated loans in part or full 
would have depleted the central bank, CBR’s, reserves.  We shall return to the banks and their 
interaction with the fiscal situation in triggering the August 1998 crisis.  Before that, a discussion 
of moral hazard is called for. 
 
                                                      
23 Dollar-denominated MinFin bonds, totaling $11 billion, were issued after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union to compensate holders of foreign currency accounts with the state-owned Vneshekonombank, a 
Soviet-era bank charged with managing external debt of the government.  Five tranches were issued in 
1993 (Soviet-era debt) and an additional two tranches were issued in 1996 (debt of the Russian Federation).  23 
 
3.4 Moral  Hazard 
Following the October 1997 spillover from the East Asian crisis, which CBR got under 
control by expending reserves and raising interest rates as noted above, Russia experienced a 
second bout of macroeconomic instability towards the end of January 1998 with investors 
becoming concerned about the growing severity of the East Asian crisis and “policy drift” at 
home in relation to structural reform.  The government’s response at the time and over the next 
few months indicated it was dealing with a confidence shock.  In mid-May 1998, the situation 
worsened, as the political and financial crisis intensified in Indonesia with President Suharto’s 
exit.  By then, it was evident that Russia was facing a “fundamentals” problem rather than a 
confidence shock.  The real appreciation of the ruble had run its course and under the 
macroeconomic program assumptions for 1998, the marginal real interest rate was over 25 
percent with real growth forecasts having been reduce to 0-1 percent and one-year GKO auction 
rates at 40 percent.
24  Public debt was clearly on an unsustainable trajectory and the market was 
signaling high levels of devaluation and default risk. 
These adverse signals could be extracted from the one-year GKO interest rate based on 
the following equation, which is an expanded form of interest parity.
25 
(x)  DRP x dx SRP i i
f
r
d    
* ) / ( ,  
In the equation, i
d is the domestic interest rate and 
f
r i is a base risk-free rate, such as the yield on 
one-year U.S. treasury bills; SRP is the sovereign risk premium and captures default risk; (dx/x)* 
is the target rate of devaluation of the currency against the U.S. dollar; and DRP is the 
devaluation risk premium, or the compensation for the risk that actual devaluation exceeds the 
target rate, (dx/x)*.  SRP was proxied by the spread of the market yield of the Russian 2001/9.25 
                                                      
24 See Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001, p. 16). 
25 This is a variant of a decomposition originally made by Frankel and MacArthur (1988).  The details of 
the calculations for Russia are contained in Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001, pp 26-29).  24 
 
percent coupon dollar Eurobond over the comparable 2001/6.25 coupon percent U.S. Treasury 
note. The target devaluation rate (dx/x)* was obtained from the macroeconomic program 
assumptions and was 9 percent for 1997 and 6 percent for 1998.  Lastly, DRP was obtained as a 
residual.   
Figure 3:  Dynamics of Sovereign Risk and Devaluation Risk Premia 
 
   Source: Figure 3, Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001). 
 
Figure 3 shows the jump in both the DRP and SRP in November 1997 when the spillover 
from East Asia occurred.  The blip towards the end of January 1998 is also noticeable.  Finally, 
the sustained deterioration in market signals after mid-May 1998 is evident.  Yet Russia increased 
its dollar-denominated external debt by $16.4 billion in the 10 weeks between June 1 and the 
meltdown of August 17, equal to 8 percent of post-crisis GDP; 60 percent of this came from the 
private sector.  Why were private investors willing to increase their exposure to Russia while at 
the same time signaling exceptionally high levels of devaluation and default risk? Because of 
moral hazard in the expectation of a large bailout by the international financial institutions and 
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“Leading Russian shares nose-dived in early trade on Wednesday as nerves wore thin ahead of crucial 
government debt auctions later in the day and hopes faded for an announcement of concrete foreign 
support for markets. “We are in a potential meltdown situation at present...there is simply no confidence 
whatsoever," said Regent European Securities' chief strategist Eric Kraus. "The market is profoundly 
disappointed by the failure of (German Chancellor Helmut) Kohl, the G7 or the IMF to provide any kind of 
support.” 
A few days later, Russia issued a 30-year Eurobond with a put-at-par after 10 years at a 
spread of 753 basis points, more than twice the spread on a Eurobond issued just one year earlier.  
It was so well-received that the size was increased from a planned $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion.  
This is what an investment analyst noted: “Readers should recognize that this issue was sold--as 
all Russian debt has been in the past several months--essentially because investors believe that 
Russia will not be allowed to fail, rather than because its fundamentals are encouraging”.
26   
In the meanwhile, the government released its own diagnosis of the situation, recognizing 
the fundamental nature of the fiscal problem in the remedies it proposed, which focused on 
raising primary surpluses and at last resolving the nonpayments problem.
27 But its immediate 
focus was on financial engineering in order to buy time: shifting away from what was seen as 
short-term expensive GKOs into long-term dollar-denominated debt in order to lower interest 
payments.  GKO auctions were skipped with Eurobond proceeds used to pay off maturing GKOs.  
CBR’s reserves were being steadily depleted and by the end of June 1998, a roughly 12 percent 
shift out of domestic assets broadly defined (broad money including foreign exchange deposits in 
Russian banks plus the market value of GKOs) would have exhausted CBR’s gross foreign 
exchange reserves.
28    
                                                      
26 Laurence Mutkin, “Actually, Russia Can Fail,” Market Commentary, Tokai Bank Europe, June 19, 1998. 
27  The core measures were outlined in two documents, “Stabilization of the Economy and Finance 
Program”, and “Stabilization Measures Plan” issued June 19, 1998. 
28 For a detailed analysis of international liquidity, see Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001, pp 30-32).  26 
 
Negotiations finally began on an IMF/World Bank/Government of Japan emergency 
package to support the ruble and restore confidence on June 23, in a crisis atmosphere marked by 
government debt now on an explosive path and dwindling foreign exchange reserves.  A $22.6 
billion package was announced on July 13, on the same day that GOR released the details of a 
plan designed to swap GKOs into long-term Eurobonds.  The IMF Board approved the package 
on July 20
th and the GKO-Eurobond swap was completed four days later.  Ironically, this rescue 
package plus the swap triggered (i.e., determined the timing of) Russia’s meltdown.   
3.5 GKO-Eurobond  Swap 
The GKO-Eurobond swap announced on July 13 had a compelling intuitive appeal: since the 
exchange rate is fixed, why not borrow long-term Eurobonds at around 12 percent instead of 
short-term GKOs costing well over 50 percent?  In one stroke, interest payments would be 
brought down sharply and rollover risk substantially eliminated, giving the government breathing 
room to implement fiscal reform and start dismantling the nonpayments system.  Few finance 
ministers would pass up such an opportunity!  The main features of the swap were as follows:
29  
(a) it was to be voluntary and market-based; (b) all GKOs maturing before July 1, 1999, were 
eligible, with a face value of $39.3 billion, and a market value of $32.3 billion at prevailing 
exchange rates.  Excluding the 60 percent share believed held by CBR and the state-owned 
savings bank, Sberbank, which were excluded from participating, the market value of eligible 
GKOs dropped to about $13 billion, held by non-residents and Russian commercial banks. (c) 
Those wanting to convert would receive an equal amount by market value of 7-year and 20-year 
dollar Eurobonds and could bid by quoting a spread in basis points over the respective US 
Treasury benchmark bonds.   
  The bid results were announced on July 20, 1998.  Even though the maximum spread of 
940 basis points chosen by MOF was much higher than the prevailing spread on the benchmark  27 
 
Russian Eurobond, only $4.4 billion of GKOs by market value was tendered for exchange.  This 
suggested that the holders of GKOs preferred to hold on to their short-dated paper and take the 
risk of a devaluation—mitigated by a large rescue package--than swap into long-term Eurobonds 
at highly attractive spreads, indicating anxiety about default risk.  But things unraveled quickly 
after the swap was completed on July 24, culminating in the meltdown of August 17, 1998.  We 
show in the next sub-section how the crisis was triggered by the combination of the rescue 
package and GKO-Eurobond swap interacting with the banks’ vulnerabilities and low foreign 
exchange reserves; the fundamental cause remained the incompatibility between the 
government’s unsustainable fiscal position and the fixed exchange rate. 
 3.6  The  Meltdown 
To recapitulate, by mid-May 1998 Russia’s economic report card looked weak: 
government debt on an unsustainable trajectory; low international liquidity (low foreign exchange 
reserves relative to the claims on them); weak growth prospects; one-year GKO yields at 40 
percent with an inflation target of 8 percent; and the nonpayments system deeply entrenched.  
Subsequently, market signals on devaluation and default as measured by the devaluation risk 
premium (DRP) and sovereign risk premium (SRP) implicit in the pricing of one-year GKOs 
began turning sharply adverse, as shown earlier in Figure 3.  To make matters worse, the falling 
oil price led to a growing current account deficit, as saw in Table 4; but the deterioration was 
small as a share of pre-crisis GDP, no more than 2 percent. 
Table 5 shows the one-year GKO yield, the SRP and DRP for key dates starting with 







                                                                                                                                                              
29 For a detailed account of the parameters and mechanics, see Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001, p 35).  28 
 
Table 5: GKO yield, SRP and DRP for key dates (% per year) 
 
Date/Key event  GKO yield  SRP  DRP 
May 15: Fiscal sustainability clearly in question 
39.3 4.8  23.0 
July 13: IMF-led $22.6 bn crisis package and GKO-
Eurobond swap announced 
102.3 8.5  82.3 
July 14  58.2 8.1  38.6 
July 20: IMF Board approves package.  disbursement size 
reduced from $5.6 billion to $4.8 billion as parliament stalls 
on key expenditure control and tax measures 
51.6 7.8  32.3 
July 23: Day preceding completion of GKO-Eurobond swap  54.2 8.2  34.4 
July 24: GKO-Eurobond swap completed.  GKO Yields 
return to [crisis levels of mid-June], SRP jumps 180 basis 
points 
66.4 10.0  44.9 
August 6: World Bank Board approves crisis package-
related structural adjustment loan and disburses $300 million  
77.7 12.0  54.1 
August 10: A Monday, exactly one week before meltdown  99.0 20.0  67.5 
August 14: Friday preceding meltdown. $1.7 billion in 
reserves lost as portfolio investors exit, bringing total loss 
July 10 – August 14 to $4.5 billion.  CBR bails out SBS-
Agro with $100 million loan 
144.9 23.8  109.5 
August 17: Meltdown Monday.  Devaluation, default and 
private financial payments moratorium announced. 
    
 Source: Data from Brunswick-Warburg Moscow.  Calculations and commentary by authors. 
 
Three things are worth noting from the table: first, GKO yields and the devaluation risk 
premium, DRP, fell substantially on July 14, the day after the IMF-led rescue package was 
announced; but the sovereign risk premium, SRP, fell only marginally.  This pattern held on July 
20, the day the IMF approved the package and released $4.8 billion: by then, the GKO yield was 
about half the level of July 13—but still above 50 percent.  And the DRP was much less than half 
the level of July 13.  But the SRP fell only by a little.  This is consistent with the idea that the 
IMF-led rescue package would alleviate short-run liquidity by boosting reserves and therefore 
temporarily lower devaluation risk; but not have time to seriously allay default concerns.
30  
                                                      
30 Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer ((2006, p. 98) argue that because GKO yields came down sharply, the 
combination of the IFI liquidity injection and swap must therefore have been good for GKO holders.  They 
describe the view in Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001) that this combination actually triggered the crisis as 
“too extreme”.  Three things to note: (i) GKO yields came down to around 60 percent on July 14, meaning 
that ex ante real interest rates were still above 50 percent and not about to help the Russian economy turn 
around; (ii) of course GKO yields would come down as the DRP was being reduced in view of the liquidity 
injection; and (iii) Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer fail to note that the SRP barely budged after the 
announcement of the package, which therefore failed to lower assessments of default risk (SRP).    29 
 
Second, the GKO-Eurobond swap clearly did not have the intended effect.  GKO yields rose 
substantially the day the swap was completed and there was a significant jump in the SRP, by 180 
basis points.  This is exactly the opposite of what one would expect from a swap intended to 
lower rollover risk (thereby improving liquidity) as well as interest payments (thereby improving 
debt dynamics and reducing default concerns).  Third, there was no looking back after July 24, as 
the situation spiraled downward.  This is what happened. 
When money management funds tried to “flip” the Eurobonds acquired during the swap to 
outside investors (hedge funds and big pension funds) as a form of exit, they discovered there was 
no appetite for the paper so that its price fell and spreads actually rose!
31  Key banks such as SBS-
Agro-- one of two commercial banks with the largest household deposits after the state-owned 
Sberbank-- had entered into repurchase arrangements with foreign banks, collateralized with their 
holdings of dollar-denominated MinFin bonds.  With the GKO-Eurobond swap adding 
significantly to the stock of outstanding Russian sovereign dollar-denominated debt, its price fell, 
triggering calls for more collateral.  The swap was soon followed by a large liquidation of dollar-
denominated government paper by SBS-Agro as it sought to meet margin calls.  The additional 
paper depressed the prices of Russian sovereign debt further, leading to accelerated margin calls 
on repos entered into by Russian banks.   
The growing margin calls on repos coincided with a large volume of syndicated loans 
falling due in August, a peak month for loan rollovers, which many banks had to repay in part or 
full.
32  Margin calls and loan repayments meant a forced sale of GKOs to raise liquidity.  Panic 
set in as depositors sought first to convert their ruble bank deposits into dollar deposits, and then 
                                                      
31 Typically, one money manager told the first author, bond spreads tighten in the secondary market so that 
primary buyers can turn a profit.  (Recall that the spread of 940 basis points at which the swap was done by 
the government was considerably higher than prevailing market spreads) 
32 Total bank debt maturing in 1998 was estimated at $2.13 billion, $0.6 billion in the first half and $1.52 
billion in the second, with a peak in August at $467 million (Reuters, end-July 1998).   30 
 
to withdraw them altogether, reinforcing the liquidity shortage.  On August 14
th, it was reported 
in the press that CBR had intervened to bail out SBS-Agro.   
CBR lost $4.5 billion in reserves over July 10 – August 14 as portfolio investors exited 
the equity and GKO markets, barely offset by the IMF ($4.8 billion, July 21) and World Bank 
($300 million, August 7) tranches received under the rescue package.  This forced the 
devaluation-default-moratorium actions of August 17, 1998.  A further $3 billion was lost before 
CBR finally floated the ruble on September 2; by September 9, the exchange rate had reached 21 
rubles to the dollar compared to 6.29 on August 14, the last business day before the events of 
August 17, 1998.  Cumulatively, Russian-era external debt had increased by close to $16 billion 
between June 1 and July 24, 1998, compared to a level of $36 billion at the start of the year.
33  
In the next section on lessons, we delve further into the conceptual and analytical 
underpinnings of why the rescue package and GKO-Eurobond swap backfired.     
4.  Lessons and Insights from Russia 1998 
  Whether financial globalization is in general good for growth or not has become a 
hotly contested subject among economists.
34  The first lesson from Russia 1998 is that at the 
least, caution is advisable when countries are going through major transitions.
35  Two 
transitions were involved in Russia: from high to single-digit inflation; and a planned to a market 
economy.  The fundamental problem was the inconsistency between trying to squeeze inflation 
out while maintaining unaffordable subsidies to enterprises in the guise of the nonpayments 
system.  The soft budgets and related subsidies destroyed any incentive to restructure enterprises, 
fueled asset stripping by managers and fed into higher fiscal deficits.  The banks—especially the 
                                                      
33 Russian-era foreign currency debt refers to all post 1/1/1992 external debt.  See Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov 
(2001).   
34 See for example, Aizenman (2008). 
35 Diaz-Alejandro’s 1985 classic on the Southern Cone experience and Chile is a case in point.  Chile fixed 
its exchange rate to lower inflation and opened up its capital account in the presence of weak-to- 31 
 
big ones in Moscow—did little to help and got used to making easy money in the government 
debt market.  Given the prevailing environment, financial globalization merely helped finance the 
soft budgets by increasing the demand for government debt and in this sense prolonged the 
unsustainable policy mix, which eventually put government debt on an unsustainable path and led 
to the meltdown of August 17, 1998. 
  But Russia was relatively lucky: it was able to recoup much of the $16 billion increase in 
its external debt incurred in the 10 weeks preceding the meltdown when it restructured its London 
Club debt in 2000.  The debt owed to the London Club was not a sovereign liability but that of 
Vneshekonombank, the Russian government’s external debt manager.  Had Vneshekonombank 
been allowed to go bankrupt, its creditors would have faced a legal nightmare; Russia offered 
sovereign bonds in exchange.  It also obtained political support for the deal on the grounds that 
much of this debt was incurred during Soviet times.  Overall, Russia secured a 50 percent write 
down in present value terms on its London Club debt, which amounted to….$16 billion!
36  
  The second lesson/insight from Russia on financial integration is a corollary to the 
first: that countries facing sovereign debt problems may actually benefit from a cut-off in 
market access if such access is softening the government’s resolve to harden budgets for 
itself or the economy in general.  The Russian crisis questions the conventional view that 
market access is always good.  For example, Eichengreen and Ruehl [2000] discuss the cases of 
Ecuador, Pakistan, Romania and Ukraine following the East Asian and Russian crises.  In their 
framework, avoiding a “.....costly, extended interruption to market access” is a prime objective of 
any debt restructuring.  Hence, they argue, the IFIs (the IMF and the World Bank) are not 
credible when they seek to bail in the private sector as part of a new money package.  Russia 
1998 offers a counterexample.  Less than a fourth of the IMF-World Bank funds involved in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
nonexistent banking supervision, leading eventually to a problem with private external debt and currency 
mismatches. 
36 For details, see Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001, p. 4) and Pinto, Gurvich and Ulatov (2005, p. 431-2).  32 
 
international rescue package was eventually disbursed; Russia pulled the plug on the package by 
devaluing and defaulting; private investors were bailed in via the default and forced debt 
restructuring; and the disruption in market access had significant economic benefits.
37   
Following the default, Russia was shut out of the capital markets, forcing fundamental 
fiscal reform and leading to a progressive hardening of budgets throughout the economy as the 
nonpayments system was at last dismantled.  Together with the crisis-triggered depreciation of 
the real exchange rate, this facilitated a remarkable and surprisingly quick recovery: whereas 
initial projections were for a 7-10 percent fall in GDP in 1999, the eventual outcome was growth 
of over 5 percent.  In fact, the recovery in industry was evident as early as October 1998, two 
months after the meltdown (Pinto, Gurvich, Ulatov 2005, p. 426-9).   
Russia’s experience does not mean one should encourage countries to default in order to 
solve an unsustainable debt situation; among other things, this calculus would depend upon the 
government’s bargaining power vis-à-vis its creditors and some assurance of a change in post-
crisis behavior by the government and private sector which eliminates the fundamental problem 
which led to the crisis in the first place.  But it does suggest that unfettered access to international 
capital markets is not always a good thing. 
  Third, the behavior of the private investors may shed some light on the “allocation 
puzzle” of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007).  They argue that not only does capital tend to flow 
from developing to developed countries in line with the Lucas Paradox, but within developing 
countries, poorer performers in terms of growth and productivity receive the bulk of the capital 
flows.  This, the authors argue, does not square with the predictions of the neoclassical growth 
model, hence the “allocation puzzle”.  Gourinchas and Jeanne offer an explanation within the 
confines of the neoclassical model, based eventually on the idea that savings and productivity 
growth are positively related and have a stronger positive relationship than investment and 
                                                      
37 See Pinto, Gurvich and Ulatov (2005, pp. 431-2) for details on the restructuring of GKOs/OFZs and 
London Club debt.  They also discuss Russia’s surprising post-crisis recovery.   33 
 
productivity growth.  In this case, some of the ‘extra’ savings will spill over into current account 
surpluses.   
The allocation puzzle is really a puzzle only if one believes capital allocation decisions 
are made in the context of perfect capital markets by investors whose objective is to maximize 
long-run growth in developing countries.  In this case, capital would flow to countries with high 
productivity growth and any deviation from this pattern would constitute a genuine puzzle.  For 
developing countries without access to private capital flows, there is a simple explanation for the 
allocation puzzle: their predominant source of capital flows is official and the objectives of 
official creditors are quite different from those making private capital allocation decisions. 
But what about emerging markets like Russia, where the predominant source of external 
funding is private?  Even here, there is a simple explanation: if the investors care only about 
short-term returns gains (are myopic) and are motivated by moral hazard, one is likely to see 
capital flows in line with what might appear to be an allocation puzzle.
38  This is the only 
reasoning one can offer to explain why Russia was able to increase its external debt so 
significantly after May 15, 1998 when it was crystal clear that the fiscal situation was 
unsustainable (reflected in the way the market itself was pricing the government’s debt 
instruments!) and why a speculative attack on foreign exchange reserves by GKO holders forcing 
a devaluation did not take place before August 17, 1998.  Investors clearly wanted to have their 
cake (charge interest rates reflecting high default and devaluation risks) and eat it (exit with 100 
percent of ruble proceeds at the pre-crisis exchange rate when a large official bailout package in 
the shape of a liquidity injection to foreign exchange reserves arrived).  
  The fourth lesson is about the dismal performance of rules-of-thumb in assessing 
the strength of a country’s fundamentals.  There was a tendency to be complacent about the 
Russian government’s debt dynamics because the ratio of debt-to-GDP was well within the 
Maastricht criterion of 60 percent over 1995-97.  As a result, the fact that instability in the debt  34 
 
dynamics was being camouflaged by the real appreciation of the ruble over this period was 
missed.   
Similarly, the sustained real appreciation of the ruble itself was seen as nothing to worry 
about because at no point was Russia’s current account balance at levels conventionally regarded 
as vulnerable--as would be the case if the current account deficit exceeded 5 percent of GDP, for 
example.  A current account surplus in 1996 was followed by a deficit in 1997 of less than 1 
percent of GDP.  The projection for 1998 made at the end of 1997 was roughly of balance, this 
being revised to a small deficit of 2 percent of GDP by July 1998, a month before the meltdown.  
But such ‘reasoning’ in connection with the real exchange rate missed two points: one at the 
micro level, the other at the macro level.  At the micro level, the sustained real appreciation of the 
ruble between mid-1995 and mid-1997 was not accompanied by productivity improvements; to 
the contrary, this is precisely when nonpayments and asset-stripping intensified.  At the macro 
level, the biggest threat to the real exchange rate came not from the current account deficit but 
from the fiscal accounts: that the deficit and public debt might ultimately have to be monetized, 
which is what the market was signaling clearly by May 1998.  By then, the Sargent-Wallace 
conditions were met, with real interest rates exceeding the growth rate; the government financing 
its deficit by issuing debt and rolling it over to keep current inflation low; and the debt-to-GDP 
ratio having hit a market-imposed ceiling, as indicated by high and rising default risk.  In such 
“micro-macro” circumstances, a real exchange rate depreciation may become inevitable, to give 
manufacturing enterprises relief and to reduce the burden of domestic currency debt via a large 
nominal depreciation.
39  Sensing this, GKO holders would head for the exit, precipitating a crisis.  
This is what in fact happened, with the timing determined by the liquidity injection from the IFIs 
and the GKO-Eurobond swap, which brings us to the last lesson. 
                                                                                                                                                              
38 The fallout from the financial sector of the US, which led to the global crisis, should be proof enough that 
the horizons and compensation structures of fund managers are consistent with the allocation puzzle.  
39 But note that a real depreciation raises the burden of dollar debt, which Russia offset by renegotiating its 
London Club debt with a substantial discount.  35 
 
  The fifth lesson is that instead of averting a crisis when fiscal fundamentals are 
weak, financial engineering could actually trigger a crisis.  This is the lesson from the GKO-
Eurobond swap.  There are two parts to this lesson: first, that the logic is flawed even though 
swapping out of short-term, costly GKOs into long-term, “cheaper” Eurobonds might seem like a 
no-brainer; and second, that the macroeconomic consequences of such swaps in the presence of 
fiscal solvency problems can only be adverse. 
  The logic was flawed for two reasons: (i) the nominal interest differential between GKOs 
and Eurobonds was not an unexploited arbitrage opportunity but compensation for the 
devaluation risk and difference in perceptions of default risk on the two debt instruments; dollar-
denominated Eurobonds are by definition not subject to devaluation risk and might have been 
perceived as implicitly senior to ruble-denominated GKOs; and (ii) by its nature, a market-based, 
voluntary swap cannot be expected to lower the present value of the government’s debt 
obligations.  This is a sort of Modigliani-Miller theorem for countries and asserts that such swaps 
are likely to be neutral. 
  But their consequences could actually be adverse when fiscal fundamentals are weak.  
Consider a government which has a solvency problem, i.e., the market believes that the present 
value of its future primary surpluses will not be enough to pay off its debt outstanding today.  
One way for the government to restore balance to its budget is to let its nominal exchange rate 
depreciate, thereby lowering the real value of its domestic currency obligations; but since the 
swap lowers the outstanding stock of domestic currency obligations (the tax base), an even larger 
depreciation is called for (the tax rate) and this recognition could spur a speculative attack on 
foreign exchange reserves, triggering a crisis time.
40  Another reason is the interaction of the swap 
with existing investor portfolios, which in Russia’s case meant rising margin calls on the 
commercial banks’ holdings of government dollar-denominated paper purchased on margin, the 
                                                      
40 A formal analytical statement of this argument can be found in Aizenman, Kletzer and Pinto (2005).  For 
more on the Russian swap and why it failed, see Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001) and Pinto, Gurvich and 
Ulatov (2005).  36 
 
price of which fell with all the additional Eurobonds appearing in the market, leading to forced 
sales of GKOs and a downward spiral.  Financial engineering is definitely not a free lunch and the 
hidden tab may be surprisingly high! 
  The situation was worsened because the swap was accompanied by a liquidity injection 
to reserves financed by implicitly senior debt from the IFIs.  This would demote the claims of 
GKO holders and become the perfect time to exit, with the liquidity injection providing the means 
of escape.  Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001, p. 43) discuss how difficult it is to design an official 
rescue package for a country in the circumstances of Russia 1998.  And much could have been 
learned from a timely post-mortem of Russia 1998, as Box 2 shows.    
5. Concluding  Remarks 
  In the case of Russia 1998, a fundamental inconsistency developed between the 
government’s desire to vanquish inflation while maintaining large subsidies to what was 
perceived as a vulnerable manufacturing sector.  This eventually placed the government’s debt on 
an unsustainable trajectory, making such dynamics incompatible with Russia’s fixed exchange 
rate.  Financial globalization prolonged this unsustainable situation by financing the 
government’s debt pyramid even after it was clear that the fiscal situation was unsustainable.  The 
reasons why include moral hazard fueled by expectations that Russia would be “rescued” by a 
large official bailout.  
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Box 2: Lessons from the 2000-01 Argentine Crisis—Déjà Vu in Russia 1998? 
A postmortem of the Argentine crisis of 2000-01 conducted by the Independent Evaluation Office of the 
IMF identified 10 lessons.
a/  In our assessment, the following 4 were the key lessons from a 
macroeconomic point-of-view (some of the lessons are related to IMF processes) and we quote:   
“Lesson 2. The level of sustainable debt for emerging market economies may be lower than had been 
thought, depending on a country’s economic characteristics. The conduct of fiscal policy should therefore 
be sensitive not only to year-to-year fiscal imbalances, but also to the overall stock of public debt. 
Lesson 7. The catalytic approach to the resolution of a capital account crisis works only under quite 
stringent conditions. When there are well-founded concerns over debt and exchange rate sustainability, it is 
unreasonable to expect a voluntary reversal of capital flows. 
Lesson 8. Financial engineering in the form of voluntary, market-based debt restructuring is costly and 
unlikely to improve debt sustainability if it is undertaken under crisis conditions and without a credible, 
comprehensive economic strategy. Only a form of debt restructuring that leads to a reduction of the net 
present value (NPV) of debt payments or, if the debt is believed to be sustainable, a large financing 
package by the official sector has a chance to reverse unfavorable debt dynamics. 
Lesson 9. Delaying the action required to resolve a crisis can significantly raise its eventual cost, as 
delayed action can inevitably lead to further output loss, additional capital flight, and erosion of asset 
quality in the banking system. To minimize the costs of any crisis, the IMF must take a proactive approach 
to crisis resolution, including providing financial support to a policy shift, which is bound to be costly 
regardless of when it is made.” 
But these were precisely the lessons from Russia 1998!  Namely, that being within the Maastricht ceiling of 
60 percent of GDP did not mean that debt was sustainable, one had also to look at market signals; that the 
catalytic approach can backfire when reserves are augmented with senior IFI loans in the presence of a 
fiscal solvency problem and actually trigger a crisis; that the market-based GKO-Eurobond swap only 
made matters worse; and that procrastination fed by continuing private capital inflows and official 
borrowing only led to a much bigger debt burden when the crisis hit. 
b/ 
a/Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF (2004), Executive Summary. 
http://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/NP/IEO/2004/ARG/ENG/INDEX.HTM 
b/Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001). 
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